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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Mark S. Wilbanks appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The facts underlying Wilbanks' convictions and the proceedings through his 
direct appeal were described by the district court as follows: 
On May 13, 2010, a jury found Mark Shane Wilbanks guilty of: (1) 
Domestic Violence with Traumatic Injury, a felony; (2) Domestic Assault, a 
misdemeanor; and (3) Witness Intimidation, a felony. 
On June 25, 2010, the Hon. Judge McLaughlin entered a Judgment 
and Commitment, which reflected that Count IV (Violation of a No Contact 
Order) had been dismissed by the State and the Defendant had pied guilty 
to being a persistent violator under Idaho Code§ 19-2514. 
On Count I, Domestic Violence, felony, the Defendant received an 
aggregate ten (10) year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement 
of seven (7) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period not to 
exceed three (3) years. On Count Ill, Intimidating a Witness, felony, the 
Defendant received an aggregate five (5) year sentence, with a minimum 
period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a subsequent 
indeterminate period not to exceed two (2) years, to run concurrently with 
Count I. On Count II, Domestic Assault, misdemeanor, the Defendant 
received one-hundred fifty-nine (159) days in the Ada County jail, with 
credit for one-hundred fifty-nine (159) days served. For being a persistent 
violator, the Defendant received a thirty (30) year sentence, with a 
minimum period of confinement of seven (7) years, followed by a 
subsequent indeterminate period not to exceed twenty three (23) years, to 
run concurrently with the other sentences. 
The Defendant appealed his sentences and, in an unpublished 
opinion issued February 27, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment of conviction and sentences. State of Idaho v. Mark Wilbanks, 
Docket No 37837 (Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2012). 
(R., p.107.) 
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On June 21, 2011, Wilbanks filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief with a 
supporting affidavit and attachments (R., pp.4-72), claiming, inter alia, that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate documents and records showing alleged 
prior bad acts of the victim, including lying to police when intoxicated, filing false 
charges, recanting statements made to police, and attempting suicide (R., pp.13-15, 66-
72). After counsel was appointed to represent Wilbanks (R., p.86), the state filed an 
Answer requesting Wilbanks' claims be dismissed because they could have been raised 
on direct appeal and they failed to present a genuine issue of material fact (R., pp.96-
100). 
The district court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, stating its intention to dismiss 
Wilbanks' ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the grounds that (1) under I.C. § 
19-4901 (b), it was waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal, and (2) 
Wilbanks failed to "allege[] facts that would show that his attorney's performance was 
deficient, nor [did] he allege[] facts that would show prejudice resulting from the claimed 
deficient performance." (R., pp.115-116.) The court gave Wilbanks twenty days 'to 
respond to its notice (R, p.118) and, after that period of time ran without receiving any 
response, the district court entered a judgment summarily dismissing Wilbanks' petition 




Wilbanks states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Wilbanks failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Wilbanks Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Wilbanks argues that "the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Wilbanks specifically contends "the district court erred when it 
concluded that the claim was waived because it should have been raised on direct 
appeal, and when it concluded that the claim concerned a strategic decision that could 
not be reviewed in post-conviction." (Id., p.4. 1) However, the strategic decision 
Wilbanks focuses on is trial counsel's decision to not call him as a witness to testify 
about the victim's alleged prior bad acts because the prosecutor allegedly threatened to 
impeach Wilbanks with his prior felony convictions if he testified. (Id. pp.8-10.) 
Regardless of whether the decision challenged on appeal is trial counsel's 
alleged decision to not investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts (and cross-
examine her on them) or counsel's decision to not call Wilbanks as a witness to testify 
about the victim's alleged prior bad acts, application of the correct legal standards to 
1 In light of the Idaho appellate courts' preference that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims be presented in post-conviction proceedings instead of direct appeals, the state 
does not contest Wilbanks' contention that his ineffectiveness claim was not waived by 
any failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. See State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 433, 
34 P .3d 1110, 1116 (Ct. App. 2001) ("This Court has consistently held that the 
appropriate procedure for adult criminal defendants to bring an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is through an application for post-conviction relief.") 
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Wilbanks' claim shows that because he did not present a prima facie claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the district court properly summarily dismissed it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). "On review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, [appellate 
courts] will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe 
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Kelly v. State, 
149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). 
C. Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief. Summary disposition is appropriate when the 
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 
the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Downing v. 
State, 132 Idaho 861,863,979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813,816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In order to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the "application must present or 
be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application 
will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629 
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(Ct. App. 2002); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 
2003) (citing Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 
P.2d at 901. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element 
on which he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. 
State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the issues on 
appeal are first, whether the petition alleged facts, which, if true, would entitle the 
applicant to relief, Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,373,825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992), 
and second, whether those allegations were "supported by written statements from 
witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, 
or [are] based upon otherwise verifiable information." Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 
617,651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Review of the record in this case shows that the district court properly granted 
summary dismissal because Wilbanks failed to raise a material issue of fact to support 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his bald assertions are not supported by 
the record. 
D. Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
6 
688 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). 
To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was adequate and "show that his attorney's 
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (citations omitted). A reviewing 
court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error without hindsight 
and presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on 
sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 
(1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984)). "Rare are the 
situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will 
be limited to any one technique or approach." Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131 
S.Ct. 770, 789 (2011) (internal quotes omitted). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not 
be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-154, 177 P.3d at 367-368. 
To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that but 
for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different." kl Wilbanks has failed to meet this burden. 
E. A Review Of The Record Shows Wilbanks Has Not Demonstrated Error In The 
Dismissal Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Wilbanks bore the burden of presenting evidence showing that counsel's 
decision to not investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts, and impeach her with 
them through cross-examination and/or testimony by Wilbanks, was deficient and 
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prejudicial performance under the facts of the case. See Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249 (Ct. App. 1989). The deficiency in the investigation must be 
an objective one, not merely a belief that a better or more thorough investigation would 
have resulted in favorable evidence. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 19,966 P.2d 1, 19 
(1998); see Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) ("in considering claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel" for failure to conduct adequate pretrial investigation, 
the Court does not address "what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is 
constitutionally compelled" (brackets, quotations and citations omitted)); Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 691 ("a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel's judgments"); Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11 th Cir. 1986) 
("[f]ailure to conduct a pretrial investigation and interview witnesses is not a per se sixth 
amendment violation"). 
Wilbanks claimed in his post-conviction petition that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate documents and records showing alleged prior bad 
acts of the victim, including lying to police when intoxicated, filing false charges, 
recanting statements made to police, and attempting suicide. (R., pp.13-15, 66-72.) 
The district court summarily dismissed Wilbanks' claim, explaining that his supporting 
affidavits showed "trial counsel considered [Wilbanks'] request that counsel obtain 
certain evidence and made reasonable efforts to obtain that evidence; and . . . trial 
counsel had strategic reasons why he did not pursue the course that [Wilbanks] now 
advocates in hindsight." (R., p.117.) The court cited statements from one of Wilbanks' 
affidavits, which alleged, "[o]n the day of trial, public defender said he wasn't able to get 
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'letter of recant' because its not in existance [sic] no more,' and 'wasn't able to get the 
police records/medical records because prosecution warned him if I tried to bring up 
that information, the prosecution would get me convicted on being an ex-felon alone 
when I get on the stand."2 (R., p.117 (verbatim from Notice of Intent to Dismiss); see R., 
p.70 (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts).) The record supports the district 
court's determination that Wilbanks' trial counsel made reasonable efforts to obtain 
evidence to impeach the victim, as well as a reasoned strategic decision to not impeach 
the victim by having Wilbanks testify about the victim's alleged prior bad acts. In short, 
based on Wilbanks' own affidavit, his trial counsel made a reasonable investigation into 
the victim's alleged prior bad acts and also determined that the benefit of having 
Wilbanks testify about them did not outweigh the adverse impact his prior felony 
convictions would have if he testified. 
On appeal Wilbanks contends it is "possible" to conclude from the district court's 
decision that the reason trial counsel did not conduct "an adequate cross-examination of 
the alleged victim was a fear that the State would cross-examine Mr. Wilbanks 
concerning prior felony convictions if he testified."3 (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Wilbanks 
further states that, taking all inferences in his favor, "this indicates that defense counsel 
2 Wilbanks' argument appears to be based on the assertion that the victim's prior bad 
acts should have been presented to the jury through testimony by Wilbanks. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) 
3 Wilbanks' argument -- that trial counsel's reasons for not calling Wilbanks to testify 
can be ascertained from the district court's decision -- is unavailing. On appeal from a 
summary dismissal order, the issue is whether the petitioner presented admissible 
evidence that there is "a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." I.C. § 19-4906(c); Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979 
P.2d at 1221. The "fact" of what trial counsel's reasons were for not having Wilbanks 
testify must be established by supporting evidence, not the district court's decision. 
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made a tactical decision based on a potentially unlawful threat by the prosecutor, as 
felony convictions are not automatically permissible grounds for impeachment." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (emphasis added).) Wilbanks argues that the court erred in 
finding his trial counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to not impugn the victim's 
credibility, when, instead, counsel's decision was based on ignorance of the law. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10 ('That the district court's dismissal of the claim on the belief 
that it represented a strategic decision rests on its assumption that the strategic 
decision was rational and not the result of ignorance of the law is evident .... ").) 
However, the record before the district court is devoid of any evidence of any objective 
shortcoming by counsel or resulting prejudice. From the underlying trial record, and 
given the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance, it is clear that trial counsel made the tactical 
decision to not call Wilbanks as a witness at trial because Wilbanks' credibility would 
have been impeached by his prior felony convictions under l.R.E. 609 if he did. 
Wilbanks' argument fails also because it is based on a factual claim that the 
prosecutor made a "potentially unlawful threat" to impeach him with his prior felony 
convictions if he testified about alleged prior bad acts by the victim, unsupported by 
admissible evidence or the law. Even if the prosecutor informed trial counsel that he 
intended to admit evidence of Wilbanks' prior felonies if he testified at trial, the 
prosecutor was entitled to attempt to do so under l.R.E. 609. Merely informing the 
defense of the state's intent to admit a witness's prior felony convictions does not 
constitute an unlawful threat. See State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (the threat to arrest Schumacher's wife was "not unjustified" because if the 
10 
officers had discovered evidence linking her to the marijuana cultivation, it would have 
justified her arrest); United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 594-595 (5th Cir. 1983) 
("Involuntariness is present if there are threats or promises of illegitimate action," but 
statements that if parents were arrested, officers would have to place the children with 
welfare authorities were true). Here, the prosecutor's alleged expressed intent to use 
I.RE. 609 to impeach Wilbanks' credibility with prior felony convictions if he testified 
was legally proper, and can in no way be branded "potentially unlawful." (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Wilbanks' characterization of the prosecutor's alleged comment as "potentially 
unlawful" appears to be based on the indirect assertion that the prosecutor threatened 
that the prior convictions were "automatically permissible grounds for impeachment." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 ("this indicates that defense counsel made a tactical decision 
based on a potentially unlawful threat by the prosecutor, as felony convictions are not 
automatically permissible grounds for impeachment").) The record does not support 
such an assertion. Wilbanks claimed his counsel told him he could not get police and 
medical records because the "prosecution warned him if [he] tried to bring up that 
information, the prosecution would get [him] convicted on being an ex-felon alone when 
[he got] on the stand." (R., p.70 (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts).) That 
comment in no way suggests that Wilbanks' prior convictions were "automatically 
permissible grounds for impeachment," and Wilbanks presented no evidence his prior 
felony convictions could not have been properly used to impeach him. The district court 
correctly determined that, based on Wilbanks' own allegations, his counsel's actions 
were within the scope of reasonable trial strategy or tactics. (R., pp.17-18.) 
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Additionally, Wilbanks has failed to support his claim with admissible evidence 
substantiating the victim's prior "bad" acts - lying to police, filing false police reports, 
admission to a state mental hospital after attempting suicide, drunkenness, and 
quarrelsomeness. (See R., pp.13-15.) Although Wilbanks attached a "recantation" 
letter ostensibly typed by the victim regarding a 2009 incident which resulted in criminal 
charges against Wilbanks, the letter bears no signature and Wilbanks provides no 
explanation of how such letter would be admissible. (R., p.58); see Goodwin, 138 Idaho 
at 272, 61 P.3d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 806, 69 P.3d at 1067. Moreover, 
Wilbanks' account of what his counsel told him the prosecutor said is inadmissible 
hearsay. 
In sum, Wilbanks has failed to show his counsel's alleged deficient performance 
was anything other than a tactical or strategic decision. "The constitutional requirement 
for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can 
dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." 
Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). That Wilbanks, in hindsight, 
wishes his attorney made a different tactical decision does not make his defense 
counsel objectively deficient. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) 
("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions will be limited to only one technique or approach.") (citation and quotations 
omitted). The district court correctly concluded that Wilbanks failed to present a 
genuine issue about whether his trial counsel made reasonable efforts to investigate the 
victim's alleged prior bad acts and a reasonable strategic choice to not present 
evidence of those acts through testimony by Wilbanks. In the face of a presumption of 
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competence and a trial record that shows the decisions by trial counsel were well within 
the range of reasonable tactical decisions, Wilbanks has presented no viable evidence 
that counsel acted objectively unreasonably, such as in ignorance of the facts or the 
law. 
Even assuming trial counsel's failure to call Wilbanks as a witness to testify about 
the victim's alleged prior bad acts constitutes deficient performance, Wilbanks failed to 
(as stated by the district court4) "allege[] facts that would show prejudice resulting from 
the claimed deficient performance."5 (R., pp.115-116.) A chain of assumptions or 
accusations is not evidence, and without evidentiary support, a post-conviction claim is 
subject to summary dismissal.6 State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 
(2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). Speculation does not establish prejudice. "It is not 
enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. Rather, the petitioner must show a reasonable 
4 Despite its statement that Wilbanks has not "alleged facts that would show prejudice 
resulting from the claimed performance[,]" the district court explained it was 
unnecessary to reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. (R., p.117 n.4.) 
5 In his petition, Wilbanks claimed, "had trial counsel investigated and secured the ... 
favorable evidence, and the jury been able to consider the material evidence of State's 
[sic] main witness to be known for quarrelsomeness, confrontations with police, lying to 
police, filing false police reports, and attempts at suicide while being intoxicated, along 
with (her) blood alcohol level being twice the legal limit (.18) on the night of said 
conviction, with the cumulative effect of testimonies by defense witness's [sic], and text 
messages introduced at trial, would have put the witness's credibility on the outer limits 
of due process, and exists [sic] a 'reasonable probability' the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different." (R., pp.14-15.) 
6 The only evidence other than his own testimony submitted by Wilbanks was a 
document showing that, in regard to a prior incident in 2009, the victim had a blood 
alcohol content of 0.18. (See R., pp.64-65.) Wilbanks' allegations are not supported by 
admissible evidence or a showing of how such evidence would be admissible. 
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probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. kl Wilbanks' bare assertion that the cumulative effect of 
the victim's alleged prior bad acts and the other testimony and evidence would have 
"put the witness's credibility on the outer limits of due process" (R., p.15) and create a 
reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different fails because it 
is conclusory, speculative, and unsupported with admissible evidence. See Ferrier, 135 
Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Contrary to Wilbanks' argument, the district court explained that absent the 
claimed errors, it was highly unlikely the jury would have returned a different verdict in 
light of its findings that Wilbanks inflicted "a traumatic injury upon the victim by striking 
her head and/or punching her in the face," and intimidated her by "threatening her with a 
knife if she did not sign a recantation letter.(71 telephoning and threatening to burn down 
her house, repeatedly sending her text messages threatening to call Health and Welfare 
on her, threatening to kill her, threatening to hurt her, and asking his friends to tell her 
that she is breaking his mom's heart." (R., p.117 n.4.) Based on the district court's 
reasoning (seen. 4, supra), Wilbanks failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland. 
Wilbanks has failed to show (1) trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
reasonably investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts, (2) trial counsel's tactical 
decision to not call him as a witness to testify about the victim's alleged prior bad acts 
was objectively deficient, and (3) any shortcoming in trial counsel's representation 
7 Testimony that the victim signed a recantation letter in a prior criminal case against 
Wilbanks would not have been perceived by the jury as evidence impeaching the 
victim's credibility in the current case. Rather, such evidence would have strongly 
suggested that the recantation letter in the prior case was made under duress. 
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prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Wilbanks' petition and supporting affidavits failed to 
create a material issue of fact as to either of the two elements necessary to establish an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and the district court correctly 
dismissed his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Wilbanks' petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2013. 
JOH,P(,C. McKINNEY ( 
Deputy Attorney General 
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